Within the given reality of Parliamentary elections and electoral processes in West Bengal, the case of Darjeeling is unique among the 19 (now 20) constituent districts of the state. It is the only district that was conspicuously incorporated in Bengal during the mid-19th century, yet it maintained a peculiar isolation from the purview of the Bengal mainland administration till the last days of the Raj.
There is no gainsaying the truth that in topographical and climatic terms, as also in manners of cultural attribution, the district, particularly its hilly portion, is still very different from the Bengal mainland even today. The substance of hill politics since the pre-independence days was based on the premises of an urge to establish a ‘monopolistic social closure’ and thereby to prevent the non-hill people in general and the Bengalis in particular from acquiring symbolic or material benefits out of the hills.
After independence, the segregationist zeal gained more political acumen and was channelised in the direction of the claim for a separate political arrangement. And from the decade of the 1980s onwards, the hill politics has become synonymous with the claim of a Gorkha homeland, to be known as Gorkhaland, within the Indian Union.
The formal political footing of Darjeeling district as a Parliamentary constituency is rather weak, as only one seat is earmarked for the whole district while the state of West Bengal elects 42 representatives to the Lok Sabha. However, the differential stands taken by the different political protagonists during the time of the Parliamentary elections regarding Gorkhaland, and the ensuing political maneuvering, make it an interesting area for concern and comment.
Commonplace strategy
The commonplace strategy of playing out a politics of ‘non-indulgence’ or the lack of it in relation to the claim of Gorkhaland, as pursued by the different political parties, largely reveal that the substance of hill politics does influence the political calculations and the subsequent electioneering necessitated by the Lok Sabha polls in the state.
The question of Gorkhaland, the way it figured out in the political programmes and actions of the different political parties during the time of the Parliamentary elections, needs to be looked afresh. To the extent the ruling parties of the state were represented by different protagonists than that of the Centre, a phenomenon that characterises the state of West Bengal roughly for the last four decades, politicking with the hills took place in a regimented fashion, raising a complete disavowal of the claim for Gorkhaland.
Such has been the stand taken up both by the ruling parties, whether it is the Trinamool Congress (TMC) of the contemporary period or the Left of the yester years. Politicking with Gorkhaland was considered as being so most unlikely or perhaps a dangerous choice that none of the ruling parties of the state ever risked entertaining it. Interestingly enough, the very attempt to keep a safe distance from politicking with Gorkhaland has itself become a very persuasive political strategy indeed. Slogans and political mobilisations emanating from such arguments like “it’s better to sacrifice one seat in order to keep the integrity of the state” or that “Bengal cannot be divided” set the tune of electoral maneuvering in West Bengal during the Lok Sabha polls.
Gorkhaland has been a viable political purchase for the ruling parties and also for the national political parties, those who used it for weighing up their relative political strength in the state of West Bengal during each general election. While the sordid claims of ‘politics of non-indulgence’ was the actual route through which the ruling parties of the state did actually become indulgent in the affairs of the hills somewhat indirectly, the direct political indulgence of the national political parties (like the Congress-I or the BJP) with the issue of Gorkhaland was far more precarious and consequential.
If the moderate and often a soft political stand on Gorkhaland helped the Congress-I to gain the tacit approval of the undisputed Gorkha leader Sri Subhas Ghising in the past, the same politicking became a handy tool for the BJP during the last two instances of the Lok Sabha polls. The point is that though the BJP has marked a trend of registering a sweeping victory in the single Lok Sabha seat meant for the district, one should not lose sight of the very fact that the said electoral victory of the BJP can hardly be attributed to the so-called Hinduvta ideology or even to the current hype of the Modi phenomenon that has played its havoc in the recent rise of the BJP at the national level.
It is worth noting that since the rise of Subhas Ghising as the undisputed leader of the Gorkhas/ Indian Nepalis, the seeds of the ‘Gorkha vote bank’ have been sown. The idea of the Gorkha vote bank is instrumental to the pattern of ethnic bloc voting that the Gorkhas of Darjeeling exemplified. Such a process is traceable from the 1980s when the segregationist politics of the hills got codified and consolidated into a single agenda politics, i.e. the achievement of Gorkhaland. Needless to mention that prior to Ghising and his Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), such regimented politics surrounding the issue of Parliamentary elections had hardly taken place.
Though The All India Gorkha League (AIGL), since its inception in 1943, was actively engaged in politics and also took an active part in the Parliamentary elections, it failed to consolidate the Gorkha voters to the extent of what Ghising later did. Perhaps, that is why the AIGL has failed to secure an electoral victory even once during the five Lok Sabha elections that took place during 1957-1977 in the district.
On the contrary, since Ghising’s rise, it became crystal clear that electoral victory in the single Parliamentary seat meant for the district of Darjeeling could be secured by any political party provided it becomes successful in capturing the ‘Gorkha vote bank’. In other words, the fate of electoral politics in Darjeeling district is determined by the hill voters even though they constitute 43.22% (as per the 16th Parliamentary elections electoral roll) of the total voting population of the district.
Data reveal (vide the following table) that whenever the people’s mandate in the district was near total or that whenever the people of the hill and the plain region of the district voted overwhelmingly, the election results were determined by the hill voters. The contribution of the hill voters has been higher than their plains counterpart in securing electoral victory for a political party.
The percentage share of the hill voters was highest in 2004, which in fact enabled the BJP to win the Darjeeling seat for the first time in the 15th Lok Sabha election with a record margin. On other occasions, the contributions made by the hill voters were considerably high than the contribution of their plains counterpart.
Keeping in view the electoral victory of the CPI-M in 1999 and also in the earlier two terms of the Lok Sabha elections held in 1998 and 1996, it would be an unrealistic estimation to hold that class ideology has persuaded ethnicity to the extent of weakening its significance in the poll results. Reality rather suggests otherwise. Ethnic politics did survive the taste of time at least since 1989 when the GNLF won singlehandedly out of its hill support base, and then onwards the process continued.
Later on, the GNLF either has supported the Congress (Congress won in the 1991 and 2004 general elections out of GNLF’s backing) or boycotted the polls (this resulted in the CPI-M’s victory in 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections). The same strategy has been followed by Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) chief Bimal Gurung in the last two elections, resulting in the assured victory for the BJP in 2009 and 2014.
By now it has become demonstrably clear that the fate of electoral politics in Darjeeling district, over the years, has got overwhelmingly dominated by the political prospect of Gorkhaland. There will be no escape from this general trend in the years to come unless the pattern of ethnic bloc-voting by the Gorkhas changes seriously.
Moreover, given the workings of Parliamentary democracy in India, where the politics of numbers trumps intent or ideology, the key to BJP’s success in the Darjeeling seat has been the effective consolidation and spearheading of this ethnic bloc-voting trend of the Gorkhas concentrated predominantly in the hills and also in and around the peri-urban spaces of Siliguri – the emerging metropolis of North Bengal located in the plains of the district.
In such a situation, where the crucial chemistry of ethnic bloc voting determines the electoral prospect of the district, the rhetorical anti-Gorkhaland stand can hardly neutralise the separatist sentiment of the Gorkhas. The attempt made so far to diffuse Gorkha ethnicity by an equally chauvinistic Bengali ethnicity in the electoral process has only proved catalytic in encouraging the Gorkhas to rely more and more upon the ethnic bloc voting pattern as a means of registering their voice.
The recurring dependency of the mainstream parties on the Gorkha vote bank as a proven strategy to capture the single parliamentary constituency of Darjeeling ultimately establishes the mass base of the appeal of Gorkhaland itself. How long in the name of parliamentary democracy will such a mockery go on?
There is no gainsaying the truth that in topographical and climatic terms, as also in manners of cultural attribution, the district, particularly its hilly portion, is still very different from the Bengal mainland even today. The substance of hill politics since the pre-independence days was based on the premises of an urge to establish a ‘monopolistic social closure’ and thereby to prevent the non-hill people in general and the Bengalis in particular from acquiring symbolic or material benefits out of the hills.
The formal political footing of Darjeeling district as a Parliamentary constituency is rather weak, as only one seat is earmarked for the whole district while the state of West Bengal elects 42 representatives to the Lok Sabha. However, the differential stands taken by the different political protagonists during the time of the Parliamentary elections regarding Gorkhaland, and the ensuing political maneuvering, make it an interesting area for concern and comment.
Commonplace strategy
The commonplace strategy of playing out a politics of ‘non-indulgence’ or the lack of it in relation to the claim of Gorkhaland, as pursued by the different political parties, largely reveal that the substance of hill politics does influence the political calculations and the subsequent electioneering necessitated by the Lok Sabha polls in the state.
The question of Gorkhaland, the way it figured out in the political programmes and actions of the different political parties during the time of the Parliamentary elections, needs to be looked afresh. To the extent the ruling parties of the state were represented by different protagonists than that of the Centre, a phenomenon that characterises the state of West Bengal roughly for the last four decades, politicking with the hills took place in a regimented fashion, raising a complete disavowal of the claim for Gorkhaland.
Such has been the stand taken up both by the ruling parties, whether it is the Trinamool Congress (TMC) of the contemporary period or the Left of the yester years. Politicking with Gorkhaland was considered as being so most unlikely or perhaps a dangerous choice that none of the ruling parties of the state ever risked entertaining it. Interestingly enough, the very attempt to keep a safe distance from politicking with Gorkhaland has itself become a very persuasive political strategy indeed. Slogans and political mobilisations emanating from such arguments like “it’s better to sacrifice one seat in order to keep the integrity of the state” or that “Bengal cannot be divided” set the tune of electoral maneuvering in West Bengal during the Lok Sabha polls.
Gorkhaland has been a viable political purchase for the ruling parties and also for the national political parties, those who used it for weighing up their relative political strength in the state of West Bengal during each general election. While the sordid claims of ‘politics of non-indulgence’ was the actual route through which the ruling parties of the state did actually become indulgent in the affairs of the hills somewhat indirectly, the direct political indulgence of the national political parties (like the Congress-I or the BJP) with the issue of Gorkhaland was far more precarious and consequential.
If the moderate and often a soft political stand on Gorkhaland helped the Congress-I to gain the tacit approval of the undisputed Gorkha leader Sri Subhas Ghising in the past, the same politicking became a handy tool for the BJP during the last two instances of the Lok Sabha polls. The point is that though the BJP has marked a trend of registering a sweeping victory in the single Lok Sabha seat meant for the district, one should not lose sight of the very fact that the said electoral victory of the BJP can hardly be attributed to the so-called Hinduvta ideology or even to the current hype of the Modi phenomenon that has played its havoc in the recent rise of the BJP at the national level.
It is worth noting that since the rise of Subhas Ghising as the undisputed leader of the Gorkhas/ Indian Nepalis, the seeds of the ‘Gorkha vote bank’ have been sown. The idea of the Gorkha vote bank is instrumental to the pattern of ethnic bloc voting that the Gorkhas of Darjeeling exemplified. Such a process is traceable from the 1980s when the segregationist politics of the hills got codified and consolidated into a single agenda politics, i.e. the achievement of Gorkhaland. Needless to mention that prior to Ghising and his Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), such regimented politics surrounding the issue of Parliamentary elections had hardly taken place.
Though The All India Gorkha League (AIGL), since its inception in 1943, was actively engaged in politics and also took an active part in the Parliamentary elections, it failed to consolidate the Gorkha voters to the extent of what Ghising later did. Perhaps, that is why the AIGL has failed to secure an electoral victory even once during the five Lok Sabha elections that took place during 1957-1977 in the district.
On the contrary, since Ghising’s rise, it became crystal clear that electoral victory in the single Parliamentary seat meant for the district of Darjeeling could be secured by any political party provided it becomes successful in capturing the ‘Gorkha vote bank’. In other words, the fate of electoral politics in Darjeeling district is determined by the hill voters even though they constitute 43.22% (as per the 16th Parliamentary elections electoral roll) of the total voting population of the district.
Data reveal (vide the following table) that whenever the people’s mandate in the district was near total or that whenever the people of the hill and the plain region of the district voted overwhelmingly, the election results were determined by the hill voters. The contribution of the hill voters has been higher than their plains counterpart in securing electoral victory for a political party.
The percentage share of the hill voters was highest in 2004, which in fact enabled the BJP to win the Darjeeling seat for the first time in the 15th Lok Sabha election with a record margin. On other occasions, the contributions made by the hill voters were considerably high than the contribution of their plains counterpart.
Lok Sabha Election Result (in %): Darjeeling District 1999-2014
LOK SABHA
ELECTION
|
Sixteenth
(2014)
|
Fifteenth (2009)
|
Fourteenth (2004)
|
Thirteenth (1999)
|
Winning party
|
BJP
|
BJP
|
INC
|
CPI-M
|
Total vote secured
|
43.45
|
51.50
|
44.74
|
44.24
|
Contribution of hills
|
59.24
|
82.86
|
52.82
|
9.42
|
Contribution of plains
|
40.76
|
17.14
|
47.18
|
90.58
|
Total Polling
|
80.70
|
79.51
|
71.11
|
86.21
|
SOURCE: Statistical Reports of respective Lok Sabha Elections (available at http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)
As a matter of fact, the CPI-M won the Darjeeling seat in the 1999 Lok Sabha polls in which the participation of the hill voters was abysmally low (10.09%), and the results were thus determined by the plains voters (CPI-M won by securing 90.58% of votes from the plains). The point is that the Lok Sabha election results of the district were determined by the voters of the Darjeeling plains only on those occasions whenever the total mandate was not accounted for.Keeping in view the electoral victory of the CPI-M in 1999 and also in the earlier two terms of the Lok Sabha elections held in 1998 and 1996, it would be an unrealistic estimation to hold that class ideology has persuaded ethnicity to the extent of weakening its significance in the poll results. Reality rather suggests otherwise. Ethnic politics did survive the taste of time at least since 1989 when the GNLF won singlehandedly out of its hill support base, and then onwards the process continued.
Later on, the GNLF either has supported the Congress (Congress won in the 1991 and 2004 general elections out of GNLF’s backing) or boycotted the polls (this resulted in the CPI-M’s victory in 1996, 1998 and 1999 elections). The same strategy has been followed by Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) chief Bimal Gurung in the last two elections, resulting in the assured victory for the BJP in 2009 and 2014.
By now it has become demonstrably clear that the fate of electoral politics in Darjeeling district, over the years, has got overwhelmingly dominated by the political prospect of Gorkhaland. There will be no escape from this general trend in the years to come unless the pattern of ethnic bloc-voting by the Gorkhas changes seriously.
Moreover, given the workings of Parliamentary democracy in India, where the politics of numbers trumps intent or ideology, the key to BJP’s success in the Darjeeling seat has been the effective consolidation and spearheading of this ethnic bloc-voting trend of the Gorkhas concentrated predominantly in the hills and also in and around the peri-urban spaces of Siliguri – the emerging metropolis of North Bengal located in the plains of the district.
In such a situation, where the crucial chemistry of ethnic bloc voting determines the electoral prospect of the district, the rhetorical anti-Gorkhaland stand can hardly neutralise the separatist sentiment of the Gorkhas. The attempt made so far to diffuse Gorkha ethnicity by an equally chauvinistic Bengali ethnicity in the electoral process has only proved catalytic in encouraging the Gorkhas to rely more and more upon the ethnic bloc voting pattern as a means of registering their voice.
Appeal of Gorkhaland
If the Gorkhaland movement is to be negotiated through parliamentary elections and electoral politics, then the political entrepreneurs must think more realistically. Political lessons of such endeavours that projected Gorkhaland as a mirage or as an unattainable goal are indicative that these courses of actions ultimately proved to be politically beneficial for the Gorkha cause itself. Consequently the demand of Gorkhaland gains more political teeth and a new set of distasteful followers.The recurring dependency of the mainstream parties on the Gorkha vote bank as a proven strategy to capture the single parliamentary constituency of Darjeeling ultimately establishes the mass base of the appeal of Gorkhaland itself. How long in the name of parliamentary democracy will such a mockery go on?
By Swatahsiddha Sarkar
Source: gorkhapatraonline
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